A model of delegated project choice
Year of publication: |
2008-06-05
|
---|---|
Authors: | Armstrong, Mark ; Vickers, John |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Delegation | principal-agent | rules | search | merger policy |
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