Adverse selection in insurance
Year of publication: |
December 2023
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Authors: | Dionne, Georges ; Fombaron, Nathalie ; Mimra, Wanda |
Publisher: |
Montréal (Québec) : Bureau de Montreal, Université de Montreal |
Subject: | Adverse selection | insurance markets | monopoly | competitive contracts | self-selection mechanisms | single-period contracts | multi-period contracts | commitment | contract renegotiation | accident underreporting | risk categorization | participating contracts | nonexclusive contracting | Vertrag | Contract | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Versicherungsmarkt | Insurance market | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | CIRRELT. - Montréal (Québec), Canada : [CIRRELT], ZDB-ID 3003614-8. - Vol. CIRRELT-2023, 40 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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