Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
Year of publication: |
2005-07
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | contract theory | hidden action | limited liability | moral hazard |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 5145 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L23 - Organization of Production ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D |
Source: |
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Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
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