Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Mihara, H. Reiju |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Koalition | Coalition | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D6 - Welfare Economics ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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