Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Englmaier, Florian ; Reisinger, Markus
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Series:	Munich Reprints in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Managerial and Decision Economics 5 35(2014): pp. 350-356
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084940