Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games

We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Amarante, Massimiliano ; Maccheroni, Fabio ; Marinacci, Massimo ; Montrucchio, Luigi
Institutions:	Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino
Subject:	Cores \| TU Games \| Market Games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory Number 13 29 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405546