Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note

This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Dargaud, Emilie
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 137-146
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	endogenous mergers \| concentration \| price competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397023