Fighting multiple tax havens
This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a 'big bang' multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their 'tax haven business' more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their 'tax haven business'. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Elsayyad, May ; Konrad, Kai A. |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Steueroase | Steuerwettbewerb | Steuerpolitik | OECD-Staaten-seitig | Steuerflucht | Kritik | Welt | OECD-Staaten | tax haven | harmful tax practices | bidding for haven inactivation |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 3195 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 639443303 [GVK] hdl:10419/46497 [Handle] |
Classification: | F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements ; H26 - Tax Evasion ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274953