Get Out the (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design for Greater Participation
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gerardi, Dino ; McConnell, Margaret A. ; Romero, Julian ; Yariv, Leeat |
Institutions: | Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino |
Subject: | Costly voting | Election lotteries | Laboratory elections |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 121 36 pages |
Classification: | C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General |
Source: |
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