Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
Year of publication: |
2011-03-15
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Authors: | Yamamura, Eiji ; Kondoh, Haruo |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Information disclosure | Special interest group | Construction expenditure | Rent seeking |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; H79 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. Other ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871166