Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Year of publication: |
2011-01
|
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Authors: | Dittrich, Dennis A. V. ; Kocher, Martin G. |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | incentive contracts | supervision | efficiency wages | experiment | incomplete contracts | reciprocity |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervision
Dittrich, Dennis, (2006)
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervision
Dittrich, Dennis, (2011)
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on contract design with endogenous monitoring ; conference paper
Dittrich, Dennis, (2014)
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Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid
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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Contract Design with Endogenous Monitoring
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