Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Series:	Munich Reprints in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economics Letters 2 102(2009): pp. 109-111
Classification:	H87 - International Fiscal Issues
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096159