On Liability Insurance for Automobiles

Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime.

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Year of publication:	2010-05
Authors:	Flåm, Sjur Didrik ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	liability \| mutual insurance \| core \| pure Nash equilibrium \| anonymous games \| non-atomic measure

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506097