Optimal incentive contract in continuous time with different behavior relationships between agents
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Xie, Yimei ; Ding, Chuan ; Li, Yang ; Wang, Kaihong |
Published in: |
International review of financial analysis. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1057-5219, ZDB-ID 1133622-5. - Vol. 86.2023, p. 1-9
|
Subject: | Continuous-time | Multi-agents | Optimal contracts | Principal-agent model | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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