Optimal Stealing Time

We introduce and examine a game in which players can steal parts of a homo- geneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The expected effectiveness of a player's theft is proportional to the share of the pie he currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved in the game, and we also investigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Gallice, Andrea
Institutions:	Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino
Subject:	stealing \| optimal timing \| pie allocation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 328 24 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D31 - Personal Income, Wealth and Their Distributions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010748224