Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Triossi, Matteo |
Institutions: | Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino |
Subject: | Information Transmission | Electoral Campaign | Endogenous Commitment |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 21 27 pages |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; P16 - Political Economy ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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