Second-price auctions with private entry costs

Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela

We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Kaplan, Todd R. ; Sela, Aner
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 13.2022, 5, Art.-No. 62, p. 1-14
Subject:	asymmetric auctions \| entry costs \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Kosten \| Costs

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g13050062 [DOI]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013368212