Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This note shows that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined in Uno (2007, Economics Bulletin 3 (17)) if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player

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Year of publication:	2009-12-01
Authors:	UNO, Hiroshi
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Strategic complementarities \| potential games \| existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2009080
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550236