Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dominiak, Adam ; Lee, Dongwoo |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 160.2023, p. 1-27
|
Subject: | Hypothesis testing | Intuitive Criterion | Off-path beliefs | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | Rationality | Refinements | Signaling games | Strategic stability | Undefeated equilibrium | Updating | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Signalling | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Statistischer Test | Statistical test |
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