The choice of peers for relative performance evaluation in executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bizjak, John M. ; Kalpathy, Swaminathan ; Li, Zhichuan ; Young, Brian |
Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1875-824X, ZDB-ID 2214390-7. - Vol. 26.2022, 5, p. 1217-1239
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Relative performance | RPE | Peer groups | Compensation benchmarking | Performance measures | CEO pay | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Benchmarking | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lohn | Wages | Soziale Gruppe | Social group | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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