The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach
This article develops a model of privatization using an incomplete contracts approach. We argue that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect both allocative and productive efficiency. Privatization is seen as a commitment device of the government to credibly threaten to cut back subsidies if costs are high in order to give managers better cost-saving incentives (a \"harder budget constraint\"). The cost of privatization is that allocative efficiency is distorted.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
Fehr, Ernst, (2009)
-
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen
Gebhardt, Georg, (2002)
-
Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn, (2012)
- More ...