When do privatizations have popular support? : a voting model
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim ; Laussel, Didier |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 100.2022, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Democracy | General equilibrium | Majority vote | Privatization | Public monopoly | Vertical preferences | Privatisierung | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Demokratie | Monopol | Monopoly | Öffentliche Meinung | Public opinion |
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