Why should central banks be independent?
Year of publication: |
2007-01-15
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Authors: | Harashima, Taiji |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Central Bank Independence | Inflation | The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level | Leviathan | Monetary Policy |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization |
Source: |
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