This paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our...

Common wisdom suggests that firms with higher productivities earn higher profits and the higher productivities of the firms benefit consumers by increasing outputs. We show that productivity difference may not matter for outputs and profits in presence of wage bill maximizing labor unions. Our...

This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.

In this essay I assess the role that is played by the two characteristics of high-tech firms in shaping their corporate strategies: short product cycles and the involvement of intangible assets in production. Short product cycles impose high-tech firms to seek complementary assets for entering...

This paper extends the literature on mixed oligopoly in two directions. First, it introduces distortions in the working of the public firm, an issue that is of some concern, especially in transitional economies. Thus the classical model of mixed oligopoly emerges as a special case of our...

Within a strategic delegation model, this paper examines in a quantity setting oligopoly framework the determinants of the degree of strategic delegation - the latter being defined as the extent of the departure from pure profit maximization. The sub-game perfect equilibrium degree of strategic...

This paper studies an effect of a horizontal merger where a product consolidation by the merged firm may alter the substitutability in the industry. We show that as the number of firms in the industry increases, this type of merger becomes profitable for merging firms, while unprofitable for...

This paper studies an effect of a horizontal merger where a product consolidation by the merged firm may alter the substitutability in the industry. We show that as the number of firms in the industry increases, this type of merger becomes profitable for merging firms, while unprofitable for...

The aim of this work is to test the Gibrat's Law hypothesis for Brazilian firms. Gibrat''s Law establishes that firm growth is a random walk, it means that the probability of a given proportionale change in size during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry. This work...

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition...