We consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains, signaling power, and social returns. The latter depend on the relative position the agent occupies in one of three di¤erent dimensions: (i) his innate characteristics, (ii) his level of schooling, and (iii) his...

This paper exploits a national university reform, introduced in Italy with an exogenous timing and an unintended delay of treatment scheme, to identify the impact on higher education participation of shortening the degree duration of the first-tier university studies. Using a degree-specific...

Theoretical considerations suggest that workers holding temporary contracts should accumulate more general human capital than workers under permanent contracts. Using matched employer-employee data, we find empirical support for this hypothesis, by showing that dismissed temporary workers are...

The goal of this paper (in Italian) is to assess the impact of consumers’ incentives to building renovations – introduced in Italy in 1997 by means of tax reimbursements – on construction sector’s economic activity. Our analysis – which absent any sectional variability in the policy...

This paper aims to analyze phenomena such as the diffusion of non-standard work and the incidence of low-paid work from a distinctive, and generally neglected angle: that of occupations. Much can be gained from a more fine-grained analysis of labour market dynamics that casts light on which...

This note introduces and discusses the concept of pu-dominance in the context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the pu-dominance criterion for equi- librium selection. The pu-dominance criterion is inspired by and closely related to the p-dominance criterion (Morris et al., 1995)...

We introduce and examine a game in which players can steal parts of a homo- geneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The expected effectiveness of a player's theft is proportional to the share of the pie he currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals...

We study a rent-seeking contest in which players have heterogeneous and private valuations. In addition to their own type, agents only know that all valuations are drawn from an unspeciÂ…ed distribution, of which they only know the mean. We obtain a closed-form solution for agentsÂ’...

This paper formalizes the pervasive phenomenon of the self-serving bias within the framework of reference dependent preferences. This formulation allows the stating of a simple rule to assess the existence of the bias at the aggregate level as well as a procedure that identifies the minimum...

We show how the common occurrence of seeing exceedingly high claims in disputes and litigations about how to share a limited resource can be rationalized by a model in which claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a generalized social welfare function, and...