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We consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains, signaling power, and social returns. The latter depend on the relative position the agent occupies in one of three di¤erent dimensions: (i) his innate characteristics, (ii) his level of schooling, and (iii) his...
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Negli archivi amministrativi dell’INPS, e in particolare nei dati dell’Osservatorio delle Imprese, il settore di attività economica è identificato in base a diverse classificazioni. I dati più recenti riportano la codifica Ateco 2002, validata dall’ISTAT nell’ambito del progetto ASIA...
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L'aggancio tra i dati WHIP e quelli del Casellario degli Attivi consente l'osservazione di tutti i percorsi lavorativi, non solo quelli coperti dai dati INPS (o WHIP). Questa procedura ha permesso di dare una parziale risposta ad una domanda che ci si pone quando si usano i dati WHIP, o di fonte...
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In questo rapporto si presentano due informazioni sviluppate partendo dagli archivi degli episodi di lavoro dipendente di WHIP (archivi RL_annui_): gli oneri sociali obbligatori (variabile oneri_sociali) e il costo del lavoro (variabile costo_lavoro). Le stime degli oneri sociali obbligatori e...
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This note introduces and discusses the concept of pu-dominance in the context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the pu-dominance criterion for equi- librium selection. The pu-dominance criterion is inspired by and closely related to the p-dominance criterion (Morris et al., 1995)...
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We introduce and examine a game in which players can steal parts of a homo- geneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The expected effectiveness of a player's theft is proportional to the share of the pie he currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals...
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We study a rent-seeking contest in which players have heterogeneous and private valuations. In addition to their own type, agents only know that all valuations are drawn from an unspeciÂ…ed distribution, of which they only know the mean. We obtain a closed-form solution for agentsÂ’...
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