Delegation and discretion
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Armstrong, Mark |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Principal-Agent Problem | Delegation | Discretion | Mandatory Sentences | Monetary Policy | Regulation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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